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Articles & News
Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace
by John Esposito
Originally published in the journal Current History, January
1994.
"To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with
extremism is to judge Islam only by those who wreak havoc--a
standard not applied to Judaism and Christianity... There are
lessons to be learned from a past in which fear of a monolithic
Soviet threat often blinded the United States to the Soviet
bloc's diversity, led to uncritical support for [anti-Communist]
dictator-ships, and enabled the "free world" to tolerate the
suppression of legitimate dissent and massive human rights
violations by governments that labeled the opposition
'Communist' or 'socialist.' ''
It is the mightiest power in the Levant and North Africa.
Governments tremble before it. Arabs everywhere turn to it for
salvation from their various miseries. This power is not Egypt,
Iraq,or indeed any nation, but the humble mosque (1).
From Ayatollah Khomeini to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, from Iran to
the World Trade Center, government leaders and opinion makers in
the West and in the Middle East have warned of the dangers of
militant Islam. If the 1980s were dominated by images of
embassies under siege, American hostages, and hijackings, the
1990s bring prophecies of insurgent movements wielding nuclear
weapons and employing urban terrorism. Headlines announce the
possibility of a worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of
civilizations in which Islam may overwhelm the West. Television
viewers see the bodies of Coptic Christians and tourists killed
by Egyptian extremists and take in reports of Algerian
militants' pitched battles with police. All fuel alarmist
concerns reflected in publications and conferences with titles
like "Roots of Muslim Rage," "Islam: Deadly Duel with Zealots,"
and "Awaiting God's Wrath: Islamic Fundamentalism and the West."
For more than four decades governments formulated policy in the
midst of a superpower rivalry that defined the globe and the
future in terms of the visible ideological and military threat
posed by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the cold war, the
fall of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism have
created a "threat vacuum" that has given rise to a search for
new enemies. For some Americans the enemy is the economic
challenge the Japanese or the European Community represent. For
others it is an Islamic world whose 1 billion Muslims form a
majority in more than 48 countries and a rapidly growing
minority in Europe and America. Some view Islam as the only
ideological alternative to the West that can cut across national
boundaries, and perceiving it as politically and culturally at
odds with Western society, fear it; others consider it more a
basic demographic threat (2).
The 1990s, however, reveal the diversity and complexity of
political Islam and point to a twenty-first century that will
shake the assumptions of many. While some Islamic organizations
engage in terrorism, seeking to topple governments, others
spread their message through preaching and social services and
demand the right to gain legitimate power with ballots rather
than bullets. But what of militant Islam? Is there an
international Islamic threat? Will humanity witness the rise of
a "new Comintern" led by "religious Stalinists" poised to
challenge the free world and impose Iranian-style Islamic
republics through violence, or through an electoral process that
enables Islamic movements to "hijack democracy''?
FAITH, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND FACT
Muslims vary as much in their interpretations of Islam as
followers of other faiths with theirs. For the vast majority of
believers, Islam, like other world religions, is a faith of
peace and social justice, moving its adherents to worship God,
obey His laws, and be socially responsible.
Indiscriminate use of the term "Islamic fundamentalism" and its
identification with governments and movements have contributed
to the sense of a monolithic menace when in actuality political
Islam is far more diverse. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and
Iran have been called fundamentalist states, but this tells us
nothing about their nature: Saudi Arabia is a conservative
monarchy, Libya a populist socialist state headed by a military
dictator. Moreover, the label says nothing about the state's
Islamic character or orientation. Pakistan under General
Muhammad Zia ul- Haq embodied a conservative Islam, and Saudi
Arabia still does; Islam in Libya is radical and revisionist;
clerics dominate in Iran. Finally, although fundamentalism is
popularly equated with anti-Americanism and extremism, and Libya
and Iran have indeed often denounced America, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan have been close allies of the United States and the
mujahideen that resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
received support from Washington for years.
The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 called attention to a
reassertion of Islam in Muslim personal and public life that
subsequently came to be referred to by many names: Islamic
resurgence, Islamic revivalism, political Islam, and more
commonly, Islamic fundamentalism. The totally unexpected ousting
of the Shah of Iran by an Islamic revolution led by the
charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the creation of an
Islamic republic under the mullahs stunned the world. Fear that
Iran would export Islamic revolution to other countries of the
Middle East became the lens through which events in the Muslim
world were viewed. When Khomeini spoke, the world
listened--supporters with admiration, detractors with disdain
and disgust or, often, anxiety.
The 1979 takeover of the United States embassy in Teheran and
Khomeini's expansionist designs, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's
posturing and promotion of a third world revolution, and
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1981 assassination by Muslim
extremists supported the projection of a militant Islamic
fundamentalism. Hostage- taking, hijackings, and attacks on
foreign and government installations by groups such as the
Islamic Liberation Organization, Jihad, and Takfir wal Hijra
(Excommunication and Flight) in Egypt and by the Iranian-funded
Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon received enormous
publicity. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s the
prevailing picture of the Islamic world in the West was of
militants bent on undermining countries' stability, overthrowing
governments, and imposing their version of an Islamic state. The
result was the facile equation: Islam = fundamentalism =
terrorism and extremism.
THE ROOTS OF RESURGENCE
The reality is that Islamic revivalism was not the product of
the Iranian revolution but of a global reassertion of Islam that
had already been under way and that extended from Libya to
Malaysia.
The causes of the resurgence are many and differ from country to
country, but common catalysts and concerns are identifiable.
Secular nationalism (whether in the form of liberal nationalism,
Arab nationalism, or socialism) has not provided a sense of
national identity or produced strong and prosperous societies.
The governments in Muslim countries-- mostly nonelected,
authoritarian, and dependent on security forces--have been
unable to establish their political legitimacy. They have been
blamed for the failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency, to
stem the widening gap between rich and poor, to halt widespread
corruption, to liberate Palestine, to resist Western political
and cultural hegemony. Both the political and the religious
establishments have come under criticism, the former as a
westernized, secular elite overly concerned with power and
privilege, and the latter (in Sunni Muslim nations) as leaders
of the faithful who have been co-opted by governments that often
control mosques and religious universities and other
institutions.
The disastrous defeat of Arab forces by Israel in the 1967 war
discredited Arab nationalism and triggered soul-searching in the
Arab world. In South Asia, the 1971 civil war in Pakistan
leading to the creation of Bangladesh undermined the idea that
Islam and Muslim nationalism could act as the glue to hold
together an ethnically and linguistically diverse Muslim
population. One finds similar catalytic events or conditions in
Lebanon, Iran, Malaysia (the riots of 1969), and many other
countries.
Islamic revivalism is in many ways the successor to failed
nationalist programs. The founders of many Islamic movements
were formerly participants in nationalist movements: Hasan al-Banna
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Rashid Ghannoushi of
Tunisia's Renaissance party, and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic
Salvation Front in Algeria. Islamic movements have offered an
Islamic alternative or solution, a third way distinct from
capitalism and communism. Islamists argue that secularism, a
modern bias toward the West, and dependence on Western models of
development have proved politically inadequate and socially
corrosive, undermining the identity and moral fabric of Muslim
societies. Asserting that Islam is not just a collection of
beliefs and ritual actions but a comprehensive ideology
embracing public as well as personal life, they call for the
implementation of Sharia, or Islamic law, as a social blueprint.
While the majority within the Muslim world seek to work within
the system, a small but significant minority believes that the
rulers in their countries are anti-Islamic and that they have a
divine mandate to unseat them and impose their vision.
In general, the movements are urban-based, drawing heavily from
the lower middle and middle classes. They have gained particular
support among recent university graduates and young
professionals, male and female. The movements recruit from the
mosques and on campuses where, contrary to popular assumptions,
their strength is not so much in the religious faculties and the
humanities as in science, engineering, education, law, and
medicine. Organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt,
Jordan, and Sudan as well as South Asia's Jamaat-i- Islami
consist in great part of university graduates and professionals.
The Islamic Salvation Front's Abbasi Madani, for example, earned
his doctorate in education from a British university, while his
younger colleague Abdelqader Hachani is a petrochemical engineer
and a doctoral candidate at a French university. Seventy-six
percent of the Front's candidates in municipal and parliamentary
elections in 1990 and 1991 held postgraduate degrees, and a
significant portion of the leadership and membership can be
described as middle-class professionals.
In many Muslim countries an alternative elite exists, its
members with modern educations but self-consciously oriented
toward Islam and committed to social and political activism as a
means of bringing about a more Islamic society or system of
government. This phenomenon is reflected in the presence--and
often dominance--of Islamists in professional associations of
lawyers, engineers, professors, and physicians. Where permitted
to participate in society, Islamists are found in all sectors,
including government and even the military.
FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER
Demonization of Islam proceeded throughout the 1980s, but by
late in the decade a more nuanced, broad-based, diverse Islamic
world was increasingly evident. Beneath the radical faade, apart
from the small, marginalized extremist groups, a quiet
revolution had taken place. While a rejectionist minority had
sought to impose change from above through holy wars, many
others reaffirmed their faith and pursued a bottom-up approach,
seeking a gradual Islamization of society through words,
preaching, and social and political activity. In many Muslim
countries Islamic organizations had become energetic in social
reform, establishing much-needed schools, hospitals, clinics,
legal societies, family assistance programs, Islamic banks and
insurance companies, and publishing houses. These Islamically
oriented groups offered social welfare services cheaply and
constituted an implicit critique of the failure of the regimes
in the countries to provide adequate services.
Along with social activism went increased political
participation. In the late 1980s economic failures led to mass
demonstrations and food riots in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Jordan. Moreover, the demand for democratization that
accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of
Eastern Europe touched the Middle East as well. Throughout the
decade many governments in the Muslim world charged that the
Islamic activists were merely violent revolutionaries whose lack
of popular support would be evident if elections were held, but
few governments showed themselves willing to put this claim to
the test. When political systems were opened up and Islamic
organizations were able to participate in elections, the results
stunned many in the Muslim world and in the West. Although
Islamists were not allowed to organize separate official
political parties, in Egypt and Tunisia they emerged as the
leading opposition. In the November 1989 elections in Jordan
they captured 32 of 80 seats in the lower house of parliament
and held five cabinet-level positions and the office of speaker
of the lower house. Algeria, however, was the turning point.
Algeria had been dominated for decades by a one-party
dictatorship under the National Liberation Front (FLN). Because
the FLN was socialist and had a strong secular elite and
feminist movement, few took the Islamic movement seriously;
moreover, the movement had been among the least well known of
the country's groups outside its borders, even among Islamists.
The stunning victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an
umbrella group, in 1990 municipal elections sent a shock wave
around the globe.
Despite the arrest of front leaders Abbasi Madani and Ali
Belhadj; the cutoff of state funds to municipalities, often
crippling FIS officials' ability to provide services; and
gerrymandering to create districts more favorable to itself, the
ruling party failed to prevent an even more stunning sweep by
the FIS in parliamentary elections held in December 1991. As
Islamists at home and across the Muslim world celebrated, the
military intervened, forcing the resignation of Algeria's
president, arresting FIS leaders, imprisoning more than 10,000
people in desert camps, and outlawing the front, and seizing its
assets.
In the face of the repression much of the world stood silent.
The conventional wisdom had been blind-sided. While most feared
and were on their guard against "other Irans," the Islamic
Salvation Front's victory in Algeria raised the specter of an
Islamic movement coming to power through democratic elections
and ballots worried many world leaders even more than bullets.
The justification for accepting the Algerian military's seizure
of power was the charge that the FIS really only believed in
"One man, one vote, one time." The perceived threat from
revolutionary Islam was intensified by the fear that it would
capture power from within the political system by democratic
means.
THE TRIPLE THREAT
In contrast to other parts of the world, calls for greater
political participation and democratization in the Middle East
have been met by empty rhetoric and repression at home and by
ambivalence or silence in the West. Middle Eastern governments
have used the danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism as the
excuse for increasing authoritarianism and violations of human
rights and the indiscriminate suppression of Islamic opposition,
as well as for the West's silence about these actions.
Fear of fundamentalism, like fear of communism, has made strange
bedfellows. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt join Israel in warning
of a regional and international Islamic threat in their bids to
win Western aid and justify their repression of Islamists.
"Israel, which for years won American and European backing as a
bulwark against the spread of communism through the Middle East,
is now projecting itself as the West's defense against militant
Islam, a movement it is portraying as an even greater danger''
(3). Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin justified the
expulsion of 415 Palestinians in December 1992 by saying that
"Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to
awaken the world, which is lying in slumber... We call on all
nations, all peoples to devote their attention to the greater
danger inherent in Islamic fundamentalism[, which]...threatens
world peace in future years... [W]e stand on the line of fire
against the danger of fundamentalist Islam."
Israel and its Arab neighbors have warned that a resurgent Iran
is exporting revolution throughout much of the Muslim world,
including Sudan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Algeria, and
Central Asia, as well as to Europe and America; indeed, Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak has urged the formation of a "global
alliance" against this menace.
Islam is often portrayed as a triple threat: political,
civilizational, and demographic. The fear in the 1980s that Iran
would export its revolution has been superseded by the larger
fear of an international pan- Islamic movement with Iran and
Sudan at its heart. In this decade, despite Iran's relative
failure in fomenting revolution abroad, visions of a global
Islamic threat have proliferated, combining fear of violent
revolution and of Algerian-style electoral victories. French
writer Raymond Aron's warning of an Islamic revolutionary wave
generated by the fanaticism of the Prophet and Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance's concern over the possibility of an
Islamic-Western war have been succeeded by columnist Charles
Krauthammer's assertion of a global Islamic threat of
"fundamentalist Koran-waving Khomeniism" led by Iran.
The Ayatollah Khomeini's condemning of novelist Salman Rushdie
to death for blasphemy for his Satanic Verses, combined with
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's call for a holy war against the
West during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, reinforce fears of a
political and cultural confrontation. This is magnified by some
who, like Krauthammer, reduce contemporary realities to the
playing out of ancient rivalries: "It should now be clear that
we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level
of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them.
This is no less than a clash of civilizations--a perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival
against our Judaeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and
the worldwide expansion of both." (4)
Muslim-Western relations are placed in the context of a
confrontation in which Islam is again pitted against the
West--"our Judaeo-Christian and secular West"--rather than
specific political and socioeconomic grievances. Thus the
assault on the West is seen as "irrational," mounted by peoples
peculiarly driven by their passions and hatred; how can Western
countries really respond to this?
The politics of the Middle East refutes theories of a monolithic
threat. Despite a common "Islamic" orientation, the governments
of the region reveal little unity of purpose in interstate or
international relations because of conflicting national
interests and priorities. Qaddafi was a bitter enemy of Anwar
Sadat and Sudanese leader Gaafar Nimeiry at the very time that
all were projecting their "Islamic images." Khomeini's Islamic
republic consistently called for the overthrow of Saudi Arabia's
Islamic state on Islamic grounds. Islamically identified
governments also differ in their stance toward the West. Libya's
and Iran's relationships with the West, and the United States in
particular, were often confrontational; at the same time, the
United States has had strong allies in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Kuwait, Pakistan, and Bahrain. National interest and regional
politics rather than ideology or religion remain the major
determinants in the formulation of foreign policy.
The World Trade Center bombing last year gave impetus to a third
current, the portrayal of Islam as a demographic threat. The
growth of Muslim populations in Europe and the United States has
made Islam the second-largest religion in Germany and France and
the third-largest in Britain and America. Disputes over Muslim
minority rights, demonstrations and clashes during the Salman
Rushdie affair, and the Trade Center bombing have been exploited
by strident voices of the right-- politicians such as France's
Jean-Marie LePen, neo-Nazi youth in Germany, and right-wing
political commentators in the United States.
NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT RISKS
For Western leaders, democracy in the Middle East raises the
prospect of old and reliable friends or client states
transformed into more independent and less predictable nations,
which generates worries that Western access to oil could become
less secure. Thus stability in the Middle East has often been
defined in terms of preserving the status quo.
Lack of enthusiasm for political liberalization in the region
has been rationalized by the assertion that Arab culture and
Islam are antidemocratic (an issue never raised to a comparable
degree with regard to the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
or Africa). The proof offered is the lack of a democratic
tradition, and more specifically, the glaring absence of
democracies in the Muslim world.
The history of that world has not been conducive to the
development of democratic traditions and institutions. European
colonial rule and postindependence governments headed by
military officers, ex-military men, and monarchs have
contributed to a legacy in which political participation and the
building of strong democratic institutions are of little
concern. National unity and stability as well as the political
legitimacy of governments have been undermined by the artificial
nature of modern states whose national boundaries were often
determined by colonial powers and whose rulers were either put
in place by Europe or simply seized power. Weak economies,
illiteracy, and high unemployment, especially among the younger
generation, aggravate the situation, undermining confidence in
governments and increasing the appeal of "Islamic
fundamentalism.''
Experts and policymakers who question whether Islamic movements
will use electoral politics to "hijack democracy" often do not
appear equally disturbed that few rulers in the region have been
democratically elected and that many who speak of democracy
believe only in the risk- free variety: political liberalization
so long as there is no danger of a strong opposition (secular or
religious) and loss of power. Failure to appreciate that the
issue of hijacking democracy is a two-way street was reflected
in the West's responses to the Algerian military's intervention
and cancellation of the election results.
Perception of a global Islamic threat can contribute to support
for repressive governments in the Muslim world, and thus to the
creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thwarting participatory
politics by canceling elections or repressing populist Islamic
movements fosters radicalization. Many of the Islamists
harassed, imprisoned, or tortured by the regime, will conclude
that seeking democracy is a dead end and become convinced that
force is their only recourse. Official silence or economic and
political backing for regimes by the United States and other
Western powers is read as complicity and a sign that there is a
double standard for the implementation of democracy. This can
create the conditions that lead to political violence that
seemingly validates contentions that Islamic movements are
inherently violent, antidemocratic, and a threat to national and
regional stability.
More constructive and democratic strategies are possible. The
strength of Islamic organizations and parties is also due to the
fact that they constitute the only viable voice and vehicle for
opposition in relatively closed political systems. The strength
at the polls of Tunisia's Renaissance party, the Islamic
Salvation Front, and Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood derived not
only from a hard core of dedicated followers who backed the
groups' Islamic agendas but from the many who wished simply to
cast their vote against the government. Opening up the political
system could foster competing opposition groups and thus weaken
the monopoly Islamic parties have on opposition voters. (It must
be remembered that the membership of Islamic organizations does
not generally constitute a majority of the population.) Finally,
the realities of a more open political marketplace--having to
compete for votes, and once gaining power having to govern amid
diverse interests--could force Islamic groups to adapt or
broaden their ideology and programs.
The United States should not in principle object to the
involvement of Islamic activists in government if they have been
duly elected. Islamically oriented politicians and groups should
be evaluated by the same criteria as any other potential leaders
or opposition parties. While some are rejectionists, most will
be critical and selective in their relations with the United
States, generally operating on the basis of national interests
and showing a flexibility that reflects understanding of the
globally interdependent world. The United States should
demonstrate by word and action its belief that the right to
self-determination and representative government extends to an
Islamically oriented state and society, if these reflect the
popular will and do not directly threaten United States
interests. American policy should accept the ideological
differences between the West and Islam to the greatest extent
possible, or at least tolerate them.
All should bear in mind that democratization in the Muslim world
proceeds by experimentation, and necessarily involves both
success and failure. The transformation of Western feudal
monarchies to democratic nation states took time, and trial and
error, and was accompanied by political as well as intellectual
revolutions that rocked state and church. It was a long,
drawn-out process among contending factions with competing
interests and visions.
Today we are witnessing a historic transformation in the Muslim
world. Risks exist, for there can be no risk-free democracy.
Those who fear the unknown, wondering how specific Islamic
movements will act once in power, have legitimate reasons to do
so. However, if one worries that these movements might suppress
opposition, lack tolerance, deny pluralism, and violate human
rights, the same concern must apply equally to the plight of
those Islamists who have shown a willingness to participate in
the political process in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria.
Governments in the Muslim world that espouse political
liberalization and democracy are challenged to promote the
development of civil society--the institutions, values, and
culture that are the foundation of true participatory
government. Islamic movements, for their part, are challenged to
move beyond slogans to programs. They must become more
self-critical, and speak out not only against local government
abuses but against those of Islamic regimes in Iran and Sudan,
for example, as well as acts of terrorism by extremists. They
are urged to present an Islamic rationale and policy that extend
to their opposition and to minorities the principles of
pluralism and political participation they demand for
themselves. The extent to which the growth of Islamic revivalism
has been accompanied in some countries by attempts to restrict
women's rights and public roles; the record of discrimination
against the Bahai in Iran, the Ahmadi in Pakistan, and
Christians in Sudan; and sectarian conflict between Muslims and
Christians in Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria pose serious questions
about religious pluralism, respect for human rights, and
tolerance in general.
Islamic revivalism has run counter to many of the
presuppositions of Western liberal secularism and development
theory, among them the belief that modernization means the
inexorable or progressive secularization and Westernization of
society. Too often analysis and policymaking have been shaped by
a liberal secularism that fails to recognize it too represents a
world view, not the paradigm for modern society, and can easily
degenerate into a "secularist fundamentalism" that treats
alternative views as irrational, extremist, and deviant.
A focus on "Islamic fundamentalism" as a global threat has
reinforced the tendency to equate violence with Islam, to fail
to distinguish between illegitimate use of religion by
individuals and the faith and practice of the majority of the
world's Muslims who, like adherents of other religious
traditions, wish to live in peace. To equate Islam and Islamic
fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to judge Islam
only by those who wreak havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism
and Christianity. The danger is that heinous actions may be
attributed to Islam rather than to a twisted or distorted
interpretation of Islam. Thus despite the track record of
Christianity and Western countries when it comes to making war,
developing weapons of mass destruction, and imposing their
imperialist designs, Islam and Muslim culture are portrayed as
somehow peculiarly and inherently expansionist and prone to
violence and warfare.
There are lessons to be learned from a past in which fear of a
monolithic Soviet threat often blinded the United States to the
Soviet bloc's diversity, led to uncritical support for
(anti-Communist) dictatorships, and enabled the "free world" to
tolerate the suppression of legitimate dissent and massive human
rights violations by governments that labeled the opposition
"Communist" or "socialist." The risk today is that exaggerated
fears will lead to a double standard in the promotion of
democracy and human rights in the Muslim world as can be
witnessed by the Western concern about and action to support
democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but the
muted or ineffective response to the promotion of democracy in
the Middle East and the defense of Muslims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Support for democracy and human rights is more
effective if it is consistent around the world. Treating Islamic
experiences as exceptional is an invitation to long-term
conflict.
Author:
John L. Esposito is a professor of religion and international
affairs and director of the Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding at Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service. Among his books are The Islamic Threat: Myth or
Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Islam: The
Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and
Islam and Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1991).
References
1 "The Islamic Threat," _The Economist_, March 13, 1993, p. 25.
2 See John L. Esposito, _The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?_
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), which I have drawn on
for this study.
3 Emad El Din Shahid, "The Limits of Democracy," _Middle East
Insight_, vol. 8, no. 6 (1992), p. 12.
4 Charles Krauthammer, "The New Crescent of Crisis: Global
Intifada," _Washington Post_, January 1, 1993.
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